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I. INTRODUCTION 
“When a secret is revealed, it is the fault of the man who confided it.”1  
Though this anachronistic position might be philosophically true, it does not 
offer any practical solution on how to protect a company’s trade secrets.2  It is 
often not feasible to keep trade secrets absolutely secret, and even if it was, there 
would be a lack of utility as businesses sometimes must share their trade secrets 
with employees or in proposals to acquire work.3 
This problem of keeping trade secrets “secret” is especially acute when the 
owner of the trade secret is either a government contractor or a private company 
hired by the government.4  Typically, when the government has a project that 
they want a private company to undertake, they will solicit either a “request for 
proposal” (RFP) or a “request for quote” (RFQ) from prospective government 
contractors.5  Trade secrets are often disclosed in these RFPs or RFQs, though 
under ostensible confidentiality.6 
In situations where the government does not respect the confidential nature 
of the trade secret and discloses it, one would surmise that the contractor would 
want to bring suit against the government and recover damages.  However, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents a party from bringing suit against the 
state unless the state has expressly consented to it.7  This doctrine exacerbates the 
damage caused by the inability to sue state governments for trade secret 
misappropriation as “trade secrecy is more important than ever as an economic 
 
 1  MAGDALENA KOLASA, TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN 
EQUILIBRIUM 7 (2018) (citing JEAN DE LA BRUYÈRE, LES CARACTÈRES, ch. V, para. 81 (1688)). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  E.g., Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill. v. Bd. Of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 618 N.E.2d 694, 699 (1993) 
(holding that a company hired to train university employees could not recover against the State 
in district court for trade secret misappropriation because the State had not expressly waived 
its sovereign immunity in its Trade Secret Act); Smith v. Lutz, 149 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 
2004) (holding that a University was immune from breach of contract suit under sovereign 
immunity despite the University terminating the contract with the appellant and continuing to 
use his proprietary software although the contract provided that the appellant would remain 
the owner of the intellectual property created in developing the software and only persons pre-
approved by the appellant would be able to access the source code for the software). 
 5  § 15.11. In general, Gov’t Cont. Under Fed. Acquisition Reg. § 15.11 (3d ed.); see also 48 C.F.R. 
§ 15.203. 
 6  § 15.14. Disclosure and use of information before award—Restrictions on disclosure, Gov’t Cont. 
Under Fed. Acquisition Reg. § 15.14 (3d ed.) (“Information provided in response to a particular 
offeror’s request cannot be disclosed if doing so would reveal that offeror’s confidential 
business strategy or the information is otherwise protected under the procurement integrity 
requirements or exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Additionally, 
the agency’s personnel may not reveal an offeror’s technical solution or any information that 
would compromise his intellectual property to another offeror.”). 
 7  Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011). 
3
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complement and substitute for other intellectual property protections, 
particularly patents.”8   
However, depending on the state, there are some limited options to bring suit 
against the state government notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  For example, although many states have enacted a Tort Claims Act or 
similar laws making them amenable to suit, these acts vary in the degree to which 
they waive sovereign immunity.9  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) makes 
the issue of state governmental liability even more complicated.  Despite the 
UTSA being broadly adopted by forty-eight states,10 state trade secret statutes 
vary significantly.11  This lack of uniformity created by the disjointed 
implementation of the UTSA has lead trade secret law becoming increasingly 
complex and less predictable, to the chagrin of businesses and individuals.12  This 
wide variation in state trade secret laws goes against the UTSA’s purpose of 
creating more uniform trade secret laws.13  The UTSA also purports to preempt 
common law “remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret”14 which further 
complicates the inquiry into the state’s liability.  
Furthermore, concerns regarding the relationship between sovereign 
immunity and intellectual property are not exclusive to trade secrets.15  The 
tension between State sovereign immunity and intellectual property also looms 
 
 8  Gavin C. Reid, Nicola Searle & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What’s It Worth to Keep A Secret?, 
13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 116, 116 (2015). 
 9  See Miles McCann, State Sovereign Immunity, 2 NAGTRI J., no. 4, Nov. 2017, 
https://www.naag.org/publications/nagtri-journal/volume-2-issue-4/state-sovereign-
immunity.php. 
 10  Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-
e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020). 
 11  Beck Reed Riden, Trade Secrets Acts Compared to the UTSA, FAIR COMPETITION L., 
https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Trade-Secret-50-
State-Chart-20180808-UTSA-Comparison-Beck-Reed-Riden-2016-2018.pdf (last visited Oct. 
20, 2020). 
 12  Patrick Ruelle, The Defend Trade Secrets Act: Why Interpreting the New Law on Its 
Own Terms Promotes Uniformity, 21 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2017). 
 13  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commission’s prefatory note to 1985 amendments (UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 1985), https://www.uniformlaws.org (search in search bar for “Trade Secrets Act”; 
then choose “Trade Secrets Act” hyperlink; then click “Documents” tab; then click “Final Act, 
with comments” hyperlink) (noting both lack of uniformity and certainty as reasons for the 
creation of the UTSA). 
 14  Id.  § 7(a). 
 15  Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (concerning copyright infringement and state 
sovereign immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 635 (1999) (concerning patent infringement and state sovereign immunity). 
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large in both patent16 and copyright law.17  This tension was evident in Allen v. 
Cooper, a copyright infringement case that was decided by the Supreme Court 
during their October 2019-2020 term.18  In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court 
held Congress could not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity from copyright infringement suit.19  However it is worth noting that, 
during oral arguments, “the justices plundered North Carolina’s argument that it 
enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit for damages for copyright 
infringement.”20  Moreover, the Court in Allen gave Congress an open invitation 
to pass a valid copyright law that could abrogate State sovereign immunity while 
noting that “kind of tailored statute can effectively stop States from behaving as 
copyright pirates.”21  Allen helps highlight how important protecting intellectual 
property rights are, even when that protection is from the government itself.  
Furthermore, trade secrets, unlike patents or copyrights, need stronger 
protections from the government because once they are misappropriated, third 
parties can freely use the information.  This is because once public, a trade secret 
loses its protection.22 
This Note argues that the best approach to protect businesses and individuals is 
to allow them to sue state governments for trade secret misappropriation.  This 
Note also argues that this is best accomplished by amending the UTSA to include 
an express waiver of sovereign immunity.  This Note recognizes although this 
would be the best solution, the disjointed implementation of the UTSA by states 
raises concerns about whether states will adopt a new version of the UTSA.23 
 
 16  See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding 
that state sovereign immunity did not bar inter partes review (IPR) of state-owned patents in 
AIA proceeding). 
 17  Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 994. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Howard M. Wasserman, Argument Analysis: Justices Pillage State Arguments for Sovereign 
Immunity for Copyright Infringement, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:20 AM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/11/argument-recap-justices- pillage-state-arguments-
for-sovereign-immunity-for-copyright- infringement/. 
 21  Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (noting that their ruling “need not prevent Congress from 
passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future”). 
 22  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (“Because the trade secret can be destroyed 
through public knowledge, the unauthorized disclosure of a trade secret is also a 
misappropriation”). 
 23  Sid Leach, Anything but Uniform: A State-By-State Comparison of Differences in the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, SNELL & WILMER 48 (Nov.6, 2015), 
https://www.swlaw.com/assets/pdf/news/2015/11/06/How%20Uniform%20Is%20the%
20Uniform%20Trade%20Secrets%20Act%20-%20by%20Sid%20Leach.pdf (“Instead of 
achieving a more uniform law governing trade secrets as a result of the recommended uniform 
act in 1979, . . . [t]he net effect of the different language enacted by many state legislatures, 
and the splits that have arisen among the various state courts interpreting and applying the 
5
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This Note will also analyze a well-reasoned alternative approach to allow 
states to be sued for trade secret misappropriation under a tort theory set out by 
the Georgia Court of Appeals in Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia 
v. One Sixty Over Ninety, L.L.C.24  That case held that a government contractor 
can sue the state for trade secret misappropriation because misappropriation is a 
tort, and the state waived its sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by 
the state when it passed the Georgia Tort Claims Act.25  It should be noted that 
Georgia’s version of the UTSA is also silent on the issue of sovereign immunity.26  
The outcome in One Sixty Over Ninety makes sense because states which have 
adopted the UTSA should not then have greater immunity than they had before 
the act was passed.27 
This Note also recognizes that using the One Sixty Over Ninety approach adds an 
additional complication to the analysis not present if states adopt an amended 
version of the UTSA.  This is because if the state waived its sovereign immunity 
expressly in its trade secret statute, an aggrieved party could bring suit and not 
have to rely on a tort claims act for waiver of sovereign immunity.28  Thus, if the 
state does not waive its sovereign immunity expressly in its trade secret statute, 
this creates complications for bringing suit because every state does not have a 
tort claims act or a functional equivalent source of law that waives sovereign 
immunity for torts such as misappropriation.29  Even though it would be ideal if 
states did have similar tort claims acts, this Note recognizes that the One Sixty Over 
Ninety approach is limited to those states that are amenable to tort suits like 
misappropriation. 
Finally, this Note will address the challenges to both approaches, as well as 
the issues arising from advocating for federal intervention under the Defend 
 
statutes enacted in each state, has been to provide us with a framework of law governing trade 
secrets that may actually be less uniform now than it was in 1979”). 
 24  830 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). 
 25  Id. at 511. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Catherine Y. Lui, Are State Governments Immune From Suit for Misappropriation of Trade 
Secrets?, ORRICK BLOGS (July 19, 2019), https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-
watch/2019/07/19/are-state-governments-immune-from-suit-for-misappropriation-of-
trade-secrets/. 
 28  Eidogen-Sertanty, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 18 CVS 546, 2018 WL 6579514, at *4 (N.C. 
Super. Dec. 11, 2018) (holding that the “TSPA does not clearly or unmistakably waive sovereign 
immunity for claims of trade-secret misappropriation” but the implication from this holding 
is that if the North Carolina Trade Secret Act did contain an express waiver, the sovereign 
immunity would be waived). 
 29  State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & 
LEHRER S.C., https://www.mwl- law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/STATE-
SOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY-AND- TORT-LIABILITY-CHART.pdf (last updated Apr. 25, 
2019). 
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Trade Secrets Act of 2016.30  The policy arguments for waiving state sovereign 
immunity for  trade secret misappropriation will also be addressed, regardless of 
which approach is chosen. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. TRADE SECRETS GENERALLY 
Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property31 that derive their value from 
not being generally known.32  As noted above, forty-eight states have adopted 
some form of the UTSA.33  For the two states that have not adopted the UTSA, 
or for cases that predate the UTSA, the definition of a trade secret comes from 
the comment to section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts.34  A fundamental 
difference between the UTSA and the Restatement definition of a trade secret is 
that the Restatement requires continuous use in business and puts less emphasis 
on secrecy than the UTSA.35  The UTSA rejected the Restatement’s continuous 
use rule because of the “requirement that the secret have independent economic 
value from not being generally known.”36  This helps encourage innovation. For 
example, if a company develops a newer trade secret protected manufacturing 
process, they still would want to protect the old one from being discovered, as 
it would still be valuable to the company’s competitors.37  Thus, if a 
government contractor submitted a response to an RFP that contained a trade 
secret involving a manufacturing process, and then later developed a better 
manufacturing process, the government would not have to disclose the older 
method just because it is no longer being used. 
B. TRADE SECRETS VERSUS OTHER FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The most salient difference between trade secrets and other forms of 
intellectual property relates to public disclosure.38  Unlike patent and copyright 
owners, “the trade secret owner is rewarded for keeping information that is 
 
 30  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2020). 
 31  Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 32  Id. at 6. 
 33  See Trade Secrets Act, supra note 10 (showing that New York and North Carolina have 
not adopted a version of the UTSA). 
 34  Risch, supra note 31, at 7 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. 
INST. 1939)). 
 35  Id. at 8. 
 36  Id. at 48. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 11. 
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neither new nor original away from the public for an unlimited duration.”39  
Thus, the economic value the information derives from being kept secret helps 
justify trade secret protections.40 
Trade secrets41 are also becoming an increasingly important alternative to 
other forms of intellectual property, especially patents.42  A primary reason for 
this trend is recent patent law developments.43  Specifically, the passage of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)44 has made trade secret protection 
more desirable in certain situations because of restrictions on patent owners.45  
Patents are also more expensive to acquire and protect than trade secrets because 
trade secrets have no formal filing requirements.46  Patent litigation is also 
generally more expensive than trade secret litigation.47  As trade secrets gain 
traction as a preferred method of protecting businesses and individuals’ 
proprietary information, stronger trade secret protections are needed.  These 
protections should extend to government contractors, who should not have to 
accept the possibility of the government disclosing their trade secrets as a cost of 
doing business. 
C. TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
To be liable for misappropriating a trade secret, a party must either acquire or 
disclose a trade secret through improper means.48  The UTSA defines improper 
means via a non-exhaustive list which includes “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain 
secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.”49  This Note focuses 
 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 26. 
 41  E.g., Michael Elkon, Famous Examples of Trade Secrets, FISHER PHILLIPS (May 9, 2016), 
https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-and-Trade-Secrets/famous-examples-of-
trade-secrets (listing famous trade secrets such as “the Coke formula, Google’s search 
algorithm, Irn-Bru’s formula, the criteria for the New York Times Bestseller List, [and] the 
formula for WD-40”). 
 42  Reid et al., supra note 9. 
 43  David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1091, 1112(2012). 
 44  Id. at 1113 (citing Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 35 of the United States Code)). 
 45  Id. at 1114 (“The AIA thus cuts both ways, but in the end, it does more to restrict the 
power of patent owners and plaintiffs, potentially causing more companies to prefer trade 
secret protection for certain inventions.”). 
 46  Id. at 1116. 
 47  Id. (“Trade secret litigation has long cost less; in 2001, patent litigation ran $3 million 
compared with $1 million for trade secret litigation.”). 
 48  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
 49  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
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on the liability for the disclosure of trade secrets when the information was 
acquired through proper means but disclosed anyway without regard to a duty of 
secrecy.50 
This parochial focus on disclosure is because the government often acquires 
trade secrets through proper means when it solicits government contractors 
through requests for proposals (RFPs).51  If the government can then turn 
around and disclose these trade secrets without recourse, then they have a have 
little incentive to keep the proprietary information secret.  When the 
state government actors are not held accountable, it invites abuse even if the 
individuals are good people.52  This is especially problematic because trade 
secrets derive their value from being secret.53 
D. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF TRADE SECRETS 
Trade secrets are becoming an increasingly important area of intellectual 
property law in the United States.54  Congress recognized this and passed the 
DTSA,55 which create private civil causes of action, and the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA)56 which criminalizes trade secret misappropriation.57  The 
widespread adoption of the UTSA by 48 states further illustrates the increased 
importance of trade secrets because the widespread adoption “has increased 
awareness of trade secret law—among lawyers, companies, judges, and others—
 
 50  Id. (defining disclosure without regard to secrecy as an “improper means” of disclosure). 
 51  § 15.14. Disclosure and use of information before award—Restrictions on disclosure, Gov’t Cont. 
Under Fed. Acquisition Reg. § 15.14 (3d ed.) 
 52  See Fazal R. Khan, Ensuring Government Accountability During Public Health Emergencies, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 338 n.59 (2010) (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 39 (Benjamin 
Jowett trans., Project Gutenberg rev. ed. 2017) (c. 375 B.C.E.), 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55201/55201-h/55201-h.htm (“In Plato’s Republic, the 
philosopher recounts the parable of the magic ring of Gyges that could make its wearer 
invisible. The effect of this invisibility is that ‘the actions of the just would be as the actions of 
the unjust.’”)). 
 53  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (defining a trade secret as 
one that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use”). 
 54  ALMELING, supra note 43, at 1091. 
 55  David S. Bloch, Can the Government Be Sued Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act?, 45 AIPLA 
Q.J. 407, 408 (2017) (noting that the DTSA received an unusually high amount of bipartisan 
support and was supported by a variety of industries). 
 56  Id. at 418 (titling a heading, “The Economic Espionage Act & Trade Secrets Act Do Not 
Create a Misappropriation Cause of Action Against the Government”). 
 57  ALMELING, supra note 43, at 1097. 
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and has provided greater consistency in the application of trade secret law and in 
the laws themselves.”58 
The increasing monetary value of trade secrets also warrants their increased 
protection.  There has been a dramatic increase in the value of intellectual property 
owned by firms in the S&P 500.59  It is estimated that almost two-thirds of this 
intellectual property held by these firms are trade secret protected.60 
E. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Waivers of sovereign immunity in the modern American legal system are 
strictly construed in favor of the government and require the sovereign to 
expressly waive their sovereign immunity.61  Sovereign immunity is a vestige of 
European monarchies and their view that l’état, c’est moi or “I am the State,” which 
stands for the proposition that the government cannot be sued without its 
consent.62  The UTSA does not contain an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, 
but some commentators argue that the UTSA contains an implicit waiver of 
sovereign immunity.63  This is because the UTSA defines “person” as including 
the “government, governmental subdivision or agency.”64  Courts that have 
addressed the issue, however, rejected this reasoning.65  These courts reasoned 
that because waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the term 
“person” in statutes based on the UTSA does not constitute an implicit waiver 
of sovereign immunity.66 
 
 58  Id. at 1106. But see Leach, supra note 23 (arguing that the UTSA has not accomplished its 
goals of more certainty and consistency in trade secret litigation). 
 59  Id. at 1104 (citing research that showed in “1975, 17 percent of the total value of the 
S&P 500 consisted of intangible assets, which encompasses trade secrets and other forms of 
IP; by 2009, the value had grown to 81 percent”). 
 60  Id. (citing research by Forrester Research that “estimates that trade secrets account for 
two-thirds of the value of most firms’ information portfolios”). 
 61  Bloch, supra note 55, at 412. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 417 (arguing that the UTSA contains an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity 
because UTSA defines “person” to include “government, governmental subdivision or 
agency”). 
 64  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(3) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
 65  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, L.L.C., 830 
S.E.2d 503, 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Georgia’s version of the UTSA, the Trade 
Secrets Act, does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity despite plaintiff’s contention that 
the “person” language in statute constituted an implicit waiver); Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill. v. Bd. of 
Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 618 N.E.2d 694, 707 (1993) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the 
“Trade Secrets Act encompasses a governmental entity of the State just as it encompasses any 
other entity” despite the “Act’s definition of “person” which includes “government, 
governmental subdivision or agency.”“). 
 66  See, e.g., One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 513; Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill., 618 N.E.2d at 707. 
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F. WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN VERSIONS OF THE UTSA 
States that have adopted the UTSA have not been uniform 
regarding its stance on sovereign immunity.  Some states, like Georgia, have 
remained consistent with the UTSA and stayed silent on the issue of sovereign 
immunity.67  Other states that have adopted the UTSA have expressly addressed 
the issue of sovereign immunity in their respective versions of the statute.68  
These states have a great degree of variation in the way they have addressed this 
issue, which is a microcosm of just how much variation state trade secret statues 
have.  This is ironic since almost all these statutes are based on the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act.69  For example, Maryland’s version has expressly stated in its 
version of the UTSA that the statute does not waive the state’s sovereign 
immunity, but is otherwise identical to the UTSA’s “effect on other laws” 
provision.70  Maine’s version of the UTSA states that their version did not affect 
the Maine Torts Claim Act.71  New Jersey’s law states that the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act supersedes any conflicting provisions with its trade secret 
act.72  Oregon has a more nuanced way of insulating the state from liability for 
trade secret misappropriation.  It does so by stating that agents of the government 
will not be liable for trade secret misappropriation if they disclose the 
information in good faith reliance on a public record request or on the advice of 
an attorney authorized to advise that government entity73  Massachusetts adds 
further variation into the mix, with their trade secret statute stating that it does 
not affect “remedies based on submissions to governmental units.”74  The great 
 
 67  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 507 (affirming “the judgment of the trial court that 
the [Georgia] Trade Secrets Act neither expressly nor impliedly waived the state’s sovereign 
immunity”). 
 68  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-1207(b)(2) (West 2018). 
 69  See Trade Secrets Act, supra  note 10 (showing every state, but New York and North 
Carolina, has enacted a version of the UTSA). 
 70  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 511 n.14 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-
1207(b)(2) (West 2018) (“Nothing contained in this act may be applied or construed to waive 
or limit any common law or statutory defense or immunity possessed by State personnel 
. . . .”)). 
 71  Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1548(1)(E) (2018) (Trade Secrets Act “does not 
affect . . . [t]he provisions of the Maine Tort Claims Act”)). 
 72  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-9(c) (West 2018) (“In any action for misappropriation 
of a trade secret brought against a public entity or public employee, the provisions of the ‘New 
Jersey Tort Claims Act’ . . . shall supersede any conflicting provisions of this act.”)). 
 73  Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 646.473(3) (2018) (“Notwithstanding any other provision in 
ORS 646.461 to 646.475, public bodies and their officers, employees and agents are immune 
from any claim or action for misappropriation of a trade secret that is based on the disclosure 
or release of information in obedience to or in good faith reliance on any order of disclosure 
issued pursuant to ORS 192.311 to 192.431 or on the advice of an attorney authorized to 
advise the public body, its officers, employees or agents.”)). 
 74  MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 93, § 42F (West 2018). 
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amount of variation in state versions of the UTSA just regarding the issue of 
sovereign immunity shows how states are diverging from the UTSA’s core goal 
of more Uniform Trade Secret Protections.  By amending the UTSA to include 
an express waiver of sovereign immunity, the UTSA’s goal of more uniform 
trade secret protections can be furthered. 
Despite the great amount of variation in state trade secret laws, most state 
trade secret laws comport with the UTSA and do not mention sovereign 
immunity.75  This lack of an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity is not confined 
to states that have trade secret statutes that do not mention sovereign 
immunity.76  Federal government contractors thus face a similar problem as their 
state counterparts.  The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) did not fix 
this problem.  DTSA is structurally like the UTSA, with a few slightly different 
remedies available, though peculiarly it does not contain the “person” definition 
contained in the UTSA.77  And just like the UTSA, the DTSA does not have an 
explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.78  This makes it extremely difficult to bring 
suit when the federal government apparently misappropriates the trade secret.”79 
Interestingly, this lack of an express waiver of sovereign immunity leads to an 
analysis similar to the one conducted by the Georgia Court of Appeals in One 
Sixty Over Ninety.80  Like many states, Congress has also enacted a federal Torts 
Claims Act that allows the Federal Government to be sued for certain tortious 
acts.81  The Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA), however, does not waive the 
Federal Government’s sovereign immunity for torts created under federal law.82  
This means that violating the federal DTSA is not a basis to bring a claim under 
the FTCA.83  Furthermore, the DTSA cannot be used to bring suit against a state 
in federal court.84  Thus, the One Sixty Over Ninety approach would not be an 
effective solution to the DTSA’s lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity.  An 
express waiver in the DTSA itself, however, would be an effective solution. 
 
 75  See, e.g., Riden, supra note 11 (comparing state and federal trade secret laws with the 
UTSA). 
 76  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
 77  Bloch, supra note 55, at 417 (noting that the “DTSA’s own ‘Definitions’ section does not 
include ‘person’ at all”). 
 78  Id. at 418 (“The previous section of this Article confirms that the DTSA does not contain 
a waiver of sovereign immunity.”). 
 79  Id. at 411-12. 
 80  See discussion infra Part III.A. (detailing the One Sixty Over Ninety approach which allows 
a violation of the state’s version of the UTSA to be brought under the state’s Tort Claims Act). 
 81  Bloch, supra note 55, at  424. 
 82  Id. at 425 (citing Glob. Mail Ltd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 208, 211 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 83  Id. 
 84  Fast Enters., L.L.C. v. Pollack, No. 16-CV-12149-ADB, 2018 WL 4539685, at *4 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 21, 2018). 
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G. UTSA VARIATIONS AMONG STATES 
As discussed above, the UTSA has been adopted by forty-eight states.85  
However, there is a great amount of variation in each state’s version of the 
UTSA.86  A commentator even went as far as to say that trade secret law is less 
uniform today than before the UTSA was passed.87  This lack of uniformity is a 
result of multiple factors.  The first is that “state legislatures [have enacted] 
different versions of the [UTSA].”88  This is because there are two versions of the 
UTSA.  The UTSA was drafted in 1979 and then amended in 1985.89  Some of 
the states that adopted the 1979 version never adopted the 1985 version.90  
Some states even have used language from both the 1979 and 1985 versions.91  
States have also made substantive modifications to their versions of the UTSA, 
even changing the definition of a trade secret.92  States have also diverged from 
the UTSA by expressly addressing the issue of sovereign immunity in their 
version of the statute; the UTSA is silent on that issue.93  Further variations 
in the UTSA among the states come from portions of the UTSA being rejected 
or new language being added.94  Moreover, state courts have been split on 
whether certain common law doctrines are preempted by the UTSA.95  Finally, 
many states have not enacted section eight of the UTSA,96 which asserts the 
UTSA “shall be applied and construed to effectuate its purpose to make uniform 
the law.”97 
 
 85  Leach, supra note 23, at 1. 
 86  Id. at 2. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 8 (noting that Washington, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, and Louisiana 
passed the 1979 version of the UTSA and not the 1985 amendments). 
 91  Id. at 9 (noting that both Michigan and Illinois used the 1979 language for injunctions 
and the 1985 language for damages). 
 92  Id. at 13 (noting that Alabama, Arizona, and California all define trade secrets differently 
than the UTSA); see ALA. CODE § 8-27-2 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401 (1990); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2012). 
 93  See discussion supra Part II.F. 
 94  Leach, supra note 23, at 16 (showing that the “California legislature deleted the ‘not 
readily ascertainable’ requirement from the definition of a ‘trade secret’”). 
 95  Id. at 41 (noting that courts are split on “whether the common law respondeat superior 
doctrine is displaced by the [UTSA]”). 
 96  Id. at 26 (noting that “Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Maine, New Mexico, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Alabama, and North Carolina 
did not enact section 8 of the [UTSA]”). 
 97  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
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H. STATE AGENT LIABILITY 
Like state trade secrets acts, there is great variation among the various states 
on tort liability.98  Generally, sovereign immunity is waived by the state either 
through statute or by case law in that jurisdiction.99  Since only the states and 
federal government are considered sovereigns, municipalities and counties are 
not protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and must be immunized 
from liability by separate state legislation.100  This distinction was created 
because, in 1793, cities were seen more like a private corporation than a state.101  
However, public universities, as state entities, generally are afforded 
sovereign immunity protection unless it has been waived.102  The fact that public 
universities are afforded sovereign immunity protection is important because 
these universities are often the entities soliciting RFPs that contain trade secret 
protected information.103 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
Relatively few courts have addressed the issue of whether a state is immune 
from suit for trade secret misappropriation.  Many of the courts that have ruled 
on the issue have, unfortunately, held that the state was immune from suit for 
trade secret misappropriation.104  The courts in Eidogen-Sertanty and Management 
 
 98  State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 50 States, supra note 29. 
 99  Id.; see e.g., Lincoln Cty. v. Luning, 10 S. Ct. 363 (1890). 
 100  Luning, 10 S. Ct. at 363. But cf., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 
900, 920 (1984) (holding that though county officials do not have sovereign immunity, any 
relief sought against the officials that had a significant impact on the state treasury would be 
considered a suit against the state and barred by the state’s sovereign immunity). 
 101  William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow 
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1100  (1983). 
 102  Steinbuch v. Univ. of Arkansas, S.W.3d 350, 362 (2019) (holding that the University of 
Arkansas has sovereign immunity protection and it was not waived); see also Univ. 
Interscholastic League v. Sw. Offs. Ass’n, Inc., 319 S.W.3d 952, 957 (Tex. App. 2010) (noting 
“it is well settled that state universities are governmental entities subject 
to sovereign immunity”). 
 103  Shaul Kuper, Entering a Tech Procurement Process? Here Are 5 Things You Need to Know About 
RFPs, EVOLLLUTION, (Sept. 12, 2014), https://evolllution.com/opinions/entering-tech-
procurement-process-5-rfps/. 
 104  See, e.g., Eidogen-Sertanty, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 18 CVS 546, 2018 WL 6579514, at 
*4 (N.C. Super. Dec. 11, 2018) (holding that the “TSPA does not clearly or unmistakably waive 
sovereign immunity for claims of trade-secret misappropriation”); Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill. v. Bd. 
of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 618 N.E.2d 694, 707-08 (1993) (holding that the Illinois Trade 
Secret Statute did not expressly waive the state’s sovereign immunity); Smith v. Lutz, 149 
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Association of Illinois both base their holdings on the lack of an express waiver of 
sovereign immunity within the trade secret statute itself.105  This is one of the 
reasons why having an express waiver of sovereign immunity within the trade secret 
statute itself would be the most effective way to allow the state to be sued for 
trade secret misappropriation.  Despite these rulings barring misappropriation 
claims against their respective state governments, the harshness of these 
decisions has not gone unnoticed.106  The recognition that denying relief to these 
contractors is harsh could help influence state legislatures to amend their version 
of the UTSA to include an express waiver of sovereign immunity. 
There are a few state cases, however, where courts have allowed suits against 
States for trade secret misappropriation, the paradigmatic example being the One 
Sixty Over Ninety case from the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed above.107  In 
that case, a creative services agency submitted a response to a request for 
proposal to the University of Georgia (the “University”).108  The information 
submitted to the University was designated as confidential.109  After denying the 
agency’s proposal, the University gave the information contained in the agency’s 
proposal to one of its competitors.110  Due to this improper disclosure by the 
University, the creative services agency sued the University under the Tort 
Claims Act for a violation of the Trade Secrets Act.111  The University then 
moved to dismiss the claim, saying that it was barred by sovereign immunity.112  
The trial court denied the University’s motion, “finding that a litigant may bring 
an action for a violation of the Trade Secrets Act under the Tort Claims Act, 
through which the state waived its sovereign immunity.”113  The University 
appealed, and one of the main issues before the Georgia Court of Appeals was 
whether the suit was barred by sovereign immunity.114  
The  court first rejected the creative service agency’s  argument that the 
government was a “person” under the Trade Secret Act, as the state had simply 
 
S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2004) (held suit for breach of contract and trade secret 
misappropriation dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity). 
 105  Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill., 618 N.E.2d at 707-08; Eidogen-Sertanty, 2018 WL 6579514, at *2. 
 106  Eidogen-Sertanty, 2018 WL 6579514, at *4 (noting that “[t]o be sure, this is a harsh result—
one that may seem distasteful” when describing their ruling immunizing the stare from trade 
secret misappropriation liability). 
 107  Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, LLC, 830 S.E.2d 503 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2019). 
 108  Id. at 506. 
 109  Id. 
 110  See id. (noting that the University picked a competitor over the plaintiff and disclosed 
plaintiff’s proposal information to a competitor). 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 507 
 114  Id. 
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taken the UTSA definition of “person” without revision.115  The court said that 
the General Assembly could have defined the “state” as a person when it passed 
the Trade Secret Act, and the fact that it did not “is significant.”116  Up to this 
point, the analysis is similar to the North Carolina and Illinois opinions that 
addressed this same issue.117  The North Carolina, Illinois, and Georgia appellate 
courts all determined that there was no express or implied waiver of sovereign 
immunity in their states’ respective trade secret statues.118  However, unlike the 
other courts, Georgia  Court of Appeals did not end their analysis there.  The 
Georgia  Court of Appeals then looked to the definition of a tort in Georgia.119  
The court noted that before the Trade Secret Act was passed in Georgia in 1990, 
trade secret misappropriation was a tort.120  The court further stated the Trade 
Secret Act “supersede[s] conflicting tort” remedies for trade secret 
misappropriation.121  The court resolved this tension by reasoning that even 
though the Trade Secret Act superseded common law tort claims, the underlying 
conduct was still a tort and cited other common law torts that had been codified 
as evidence.122  Thus, the Court of Appeals held that violation of the Trade 
Secrets Act constitutes a tort under Georgia law, allowing the plaintiff to sue the 
University under the Torts Claim Act, which does expressly waive sovereign 
immunity.123 
B. ARGUMENTS FOR WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE UTSA 
States should amend their versions of the UTSA and add a 
provision expressly waiving their sovereign immunity.  This is the most direct 
and efficient way to solve the problem of allowing state governments to 
misappropriate trade secrets without recourse.  Even courts barring trade secret 
misappropriation  suits against the government note how harsh the result is.124  
One of the primary benefits of waiving sovereign immunity in the UTSA is that it 
 
 115  Id at 507, 509 n.9; see discussion supra Part II.C. 
 116  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 509. 
 117  Eidogen-Sertanty, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 18 CVS 546, 2018 WL 6579514, at *4 (N.C. 
Super. Dec. 11, 2018); Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 618 N.E.2d 
694, 707-08 (1993). 
 118  Eidogen-Sertanty, 2018 WL 6579514, at *4; Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill., 618 N.E.2d at 707-08; One 
Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 509. 
 119  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 510 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-1-1 (2018)). 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. (alteration in original)(quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767 (a)). 
 122  Id. n.13 (noting that “the Board’s argument that a Trade Secrets Act violation is a 
statutory remedy rather than a tort is belied by other common law torts that have been 
codified” like O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 (false imprisonment) and O.C.G.A. § 51-7-85 (abusive 
litigation)). 
 123  Id. 
 124  Eidogen-Sertanty, 2018 WL 6579514, at *4. 
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avoids the dismissal of trade secret claims against the government based solely 
on a lack of an express waiver.  The lack of an express waiver of sovereign 
immunity within the trade secret statute itself has been cited by courts who have 
addressed the issue as the rationale for their decisions to bar the claim.125  An 
express waiver would remove the primary bar to such claims.  
Another reason to have an express waiver of sovereign immunity within the 
UTSA is that a government contractor would not have to rely on another statute 
like a tort claims act to bring suit.126  Many tort claims acts are not as permissive 
as Georgia’s, making the “misappropriation as a tort” theory not viable in every 
jurisdiction.127  Thus, the court’s hands would be tied if the state’s tort claims act 
did not allow suits for misappropriation or the state did not have the functional 
equivalent of a tort claims act at all. 
Furthermore, waiving sovereign immunity within the trade secret itself would 
make suing the state far easier,128 and would allow government contractors to 
seek the same remedies that would be available when suing a private company.  
This is relevant because some states  have tort claims acts that allow suits against 
them but restrict the available remedies.129  Other states vest the subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case in aclaims court that only offers restricted 
remedies.130  Government contractors should have the same remedies available to 
them against the government, and expressly waiving sovereign immunity will 
expand the types of relief contractors would be able to pursue. 
C. ARGUMENTS FOR THE ONE SIXTY OVER NINETY APPROACH 
Although expressly waiving sovereign immunity in the UTSA is the preferred 
method, the One Sixty Over Ninety approach still achieves many of the same goals.  
As discussed above, this approach does have drawbacks that are not present if the 
UTSA is directly amended.131  Still, allowing government contractors to sue for 
trade secret misappropriation under a tort theory gives them a remedy against 
 
 125  See discussion, supra Part III.A. 
 126  Id. 
 127  See State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 50 States, supra note 29, at 12 (breaking 
down Georgia’s tort claims act and comparing to other states’ in a table). 
 128  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 511 n.15 (noting that “the Georgia whistleblower 
statute provided a cause of action separate from the Tort Claims Act” because it contained an 
express waiver of sovereign immunity). 
 129  See State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 50 States, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that 
33 states have damage caps for suits against the state). 
 130  Mgmt. Ass’n of Ill. v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 618 N.E.2d 694 (1993) (vesting 
subject matter jurisdiction for suits against the state in a court of claims). 
 131  See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text (explaining the drawbacks of having to 
rely on a separate statute for relief other than the version of the UTSA itself). 
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the government, which is the ultimate goal.132  Moreover, allowing government 
contractors to sue the state for trade secret misappropriation under a tort theory 
is logically sound as “the Restatements, UTSA, and most state courts rely on the 
tort theory as the justification for trade secret rights.”133  Other states have also 
held that misappropriating trade secrets is a statutory tort, further reinforcing the 
One Sixty Over Ninety approach.134 
Finally, this approach is still a viable alternative because it comports with the 
current UTSA and its silence on the issue of sovereign immunity.135  The states that 
have adopted similar “effect on law” provisions as the UTSA in their respective 
trade secret statutes should follow the same One Sixty Over Ninety approach if the 
UTSA is not amended to include an express waiver of sovereign immunity that 
is subsequently adopted by states that have codified a version of the UTSA and 
have a tort claims act like the one in Georgia.136  Adhering to the current UTSA 
in this way would still help bring uniformity to the still disjointed area of trade 
secret law.137 
D. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
No matter which approach is taken, the same policy rationales apply to 
reinforce the idea that government contractors should be able to sue state 
governments for trade secret misappropriation. 
The first reason is that it allows government contractors to protect one of 
their most valuable assets: their trade secrets.138  Not only would this approach 
give contractors a legal remedy, but it would also have a substantial deterrent 
effect.  State actors would be more careful about making sure trade secrets 
remain confidential if their departments were liable for damages. 
 
 132  See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning behind One 
Sixty Over Ninety “misappropriation as a tort” approach ). 
 133  Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights 
in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172, 182 (2014). 
 134  See U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, No. 08-2571, 2010 WL 1403958, at *4 (E.D. La. 
Apr. 1, 2010) (“Misappropriation of a trade secret is a statutory tort in Virginia under its 
version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . .”); see also Env’t Health Testing, L.L.C. v. Lake 
City Sch. Bd., No. 5:11-CV-121-OC-10TBS, 2011 WL 13295825, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 
2011) (denying schools board’s motion to dismiss for “the state law misappropriation of trade 
secrets claim on the ground that it is entitled to sovereign immunity”). 
 135  Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. One Sixty Over Ninety, L.L.C., 830 S.E.2d 
503, 511  n.14 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). 
 136  Id. at 507 (affirming “the judgment of the trial court that the [Georgia] Trade Secrets Act 
neither expressly nor impliedly waived the state’s sovereign immunity” which is consistent 
with the UTSA on being silent on the issue of State sovereign immunity). 
 137  Leach, supra note 23. 
 138  See discussion supra Part II.B. (discussing the increasing value and number of trade 
secrets). 
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Furthermore, if the government was immune from trade secret 
misappropriation claims, the inherent unfairness is great.  In situations like the 
in One Sixty Over Ninety, notions of fairness and equity militate against allowing 
the government to prevail on its immunity argument.139  The State should not be 
able to willfully infringe on trade secrets with impunity.  The entire system for 
bidding on government contracts, where the government chooses the lower-
priced bid, would be undermined if the government could simply reject a 
proposal and give the trade secrets within that proposal to the lower bidding 
competitor without the threat of recourse.  Allowing this to happen seems 
antithetical to any conception of fairness, but this was the fact pattern in One Sixty 
Over Ninety.140  Luckily, the court allowed the government to be sued for 
misappropriating the creative agency’s trade secret, avoiding such a harsh 
result.141 
Another reason that government contractors should be able to sue the state 
for trade secret misappropriation is because of the unique damage 
misappropriating a trade secret causes its owner.  This unique damage stems from 
the fact that once a trade secret is misappropriated, there is the risk that the trade 
secret is no longer sufficiently secret enough to be afforded protection.  This risk 
is especially acute if third parties learn about the trade secret through no fault of 
their own since the trade secret owner would not be able to sue them for trade 
secret misappropriation.  This damage is not feared by the owners of patents and 
copyrights, who can seek injunctions against people using their intellectual 
property, even if they are third parties.  Thus, if the government misappropriates 
a trade secret and the trade secret becomes “generally known,” the owner cannot 
recover from either the government because of sovereign immunity or any third 
party since they did not misappropriate the trade secret.   Moreover, if a “trade secret 
enters the public domain, whether legitimately or through misappropriation, it 
cannot be reclaimed.”142  This makes protecting trade secrets ex ante even more 
important and allowing the government to be liable for trade secret 
misappropriation can provide that deterrent effect. 
E. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO BE SUED FOR 
TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
The main argument for sovereign immunity in general, and barring suits 
against the states for trade secret misappropriation in particular, is that sovereign 
 
 139  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 511. 
 140  Id. at 506. 
 141  Id. at 511. 
 142  Argento, supra note 132, at 172. 
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immunity is a device whose primary purpose is saving the state money.143  It is 
argued that exposing the state, and therefore the taxpayers, to additional liability 
would be unduly burdensome to states.144  It seems patently unfair, however, to 
have government contractors shoulder the burden of that state’s wrongful act of 
misappropriating a trade secret.145  It makes more sense to have the cost of an 
illegal government action be spread through the population instead of being born 
by the party who was wronged.146  This is because government accountability 
should be more important than simply shielding the government from paying 
judgments.147  Finally, another reason people would reject an approach that 
expands trade secret liability to the government is the feat that expanding trade 
secret laws will be detrimental to the American economy by stifling innovation 
and making the market less competitive.148  One reason they argue innovation 
will be stifled and markets will be less competitive is that increasing trade secret 
protections can create an monopoly on trade secret information, preventing 
other companies from using that information to create better products.149  Even 
accepting this argument, making the government liable does not expand existing 
trade secrets protections by making it easier to prove the elements of trade secret 
misappropriation, it simply allows the government to be liable for its wrongful acts.  
People are also wary of expanding trade secret laws due to the potential of 
encouraging “trade secret trolls,” who similar to patent trolls, would simply try 
and use aggressive tactics to get companies to settle suits instead of legitimately 
trying to protect their intellectual property.150  Since, however, both approaches 
offered in this Note only make the government amenable to trade secret 
 
 143  One Sixty Over Ninety, 830 S.E.2d at 507 (“[T]he primary purpose of sovereign immunity 
is to protect state coffers.” (citing In the Interest of A. V. B., 482 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. 1997)); see 
also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999 ( “Not only must a State defend or default but 
also it must face the prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the 
disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or 
perhaps even government buildings or property which the State administers on the public’s 
behalf.”). 
 144  Erwin Chemerinksky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1217 (2001). 
(noting that “[s]overeign immunity assumes that providing the government immunity, so as to 
safeguard government treasuries, is more important than ensuring government 
accountability.”). 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Argento, supra note 132, at 174. 
 149  Id. at 175. 
 150  David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. ONLINE 230, 231 n.1 (2015), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-
online/vol71/iss4/3 (“The potential trolling here is the hyper-aggressive use of alleged trade 
secret status to intimidate, vex, and exact settlements, . . . [i]n that way, trade secret trolls may 
exhibit the same tactical behavior as patent trolls even as their alleged rights acquisition may 
differ.”). 
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misappropriation suits, and do not change other aspects of trade secret law, trade 
secret trolling is also not an issue.  The concern about trade secret trolling stems 
from federal trade secret statutes like the DTSA creating uncertainty in the law  
as the statutes scope is worked out in the federal courts.151  However, simply 
amending state trade secret statutes or tort claims acts to allow the plaintiffs to 
bring suit against the government raises none of these uncertainty concerns, as 
the government would just be subject to suit the same as a private citizen in that 
state and courts in those states would be able to rely on the same body of trade 
secret law.  Even those worried about trade secret trolls do so because of federal 
trade secret statutes like the DTSA, not because of the UTSA.152  Thus, as trade 
secret trolling is not an issue under the UTSA,  it is highly unlikely that allowing 
the government to be liable for trade secret misappropriation by amending the 
UTSA to include a waiver of sovereign immunity will have any impact on the 
amount of trade secret trolling.153 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Trade secrets are an increasingly important part of the United States economy.  
This increasing importance warrants evaluating our current trade secret laws to 
gauge if they are affording adequate protection.  An evaluation of current trade 
secret laws reveals that the UTSA does not provide adequate protection against 
state governments themselves.  The protection is inadequate because one of the 
primary purposes of trade secret law is to protect economically valuable trade 
secrets from being misappropriated.  The UTSA does not help prevent the 
government, who encounters a great number of trade secrets through the RFP 
process, from misappropriating those trade secrets.  This is because the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity shields the government from liability. 
The government’s misappropriation is especially pernicious since once a trade 
secret is not “secret” it loses its protection.  Expressly waiving the state’s 
sovereign immunity in the UTSA would be the best way to avoid this harsh 
result.  The approach taken by the Georgia appellate court in One Sixty Over Ninety 
is a viable alternative to protect trade secrets from state government 
misappropriation if the UTSA is not amended to include an express waiver of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
 151  Id. at 247 (noting that “while federal jurisprudence is developing to apply the new law 
[DTSA], we should expect aggressive trolling to emerge while courts sort out what the Acts 
actually do and do not do and how to respond to their notable weaknesses.”). 
 152  Id. at 248 (preferring a the widely adopted uniform law, the UTSA, over the federal 
DTSA). 
 153  Id. at 263 (noting that “[t]rade secret trolls have been unable to emerge thus far because 
of the strengths of uniform state law and the checks against abuse found in established trade 
secret principles and corollary state law involving noncompete covenants and invention 
ownership.”). 
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There are also compelling polices rationales for allowing government 
contractors to sue the government for trade secret misappropriation.  
Government contractors should not have to bear the burden when the state 
commits an illegal act.  Allowing state governments to be liable for trade secret 
misappropriation will help promote fairness, justice, and aid in making trade 
secret law more uniform. 
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